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12. Decentralizing Egypt: Not Just
Another Economic Reform
Jorge M artinez-Vazquez and Andrey Tim ofeev

INTRODUCTION
Egypt is a unitary country w ith one o f the longest centralized traditions in
the world reaching back several m illennia to the tim es o f the pharaohs.
Later, local councils ( Diwans) set up by the French in 1798 w ere not elected
and played a purely consultative/advisory role. In m odem Egypt, the regim e
introduced through the revolution o f 1952 by N asser has rem ained quite
attached to a centralized form o f governm ent with several m anifestations o f
territorial deconcentration largely based on the Soviet budgeting m o d el.1
Although, as discussed below, there has been considerable econom ic
progress and m odernization o f m arket institutions in recent tim es, E gypt's
public sector rem ains bloated and inefficient, and basically unable to
im prove the quality o f basic services such as health and education for its
citizens.2 T his has had adverse im pacts on the standard o f living o f citizens
and on the ability to put the country on a sustainable path o f econom ic
growth. T hese failings have also had an impact on the popularity and
acceptance o f the current political regim e. A lthough form ally Egypt is a
parliam entary dem ocratic system, de facto, the N ational D em ocratic Party
(ND P) has ruled the country as a single-party regim e under strong
presidential rule. The failings o f the current system o f governance vis-a-vis
the delivery o f public services has caused the current governm ent to becom e
interested in finding, or at least exploring the possibility of, a solution in
som e form o f decentralization reform . But a successful decentralization
effort will require the political em pow erm ent o f local com m unities and this
is a step that som e in the current regim e are unsure can be taken, w hile at
the sam e tim e there are others that feel that this is a step that the regim e
cannot afford not to take. C hanging the political landscape and status quo
from the bottom up is the m ost significant obstacle on the horizon for
genuine decentralization reform in Egypt.
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JU ST ANOTHER ECONOMIC REFORM? THE POLITICS
OF DECENTRALIZATIO N
Egypt has a good record on several successful reform program s aim ing at
resolving significant econom ic crises in the last couple o f decades. After the
unraveling o f the econom ic boom o f th e 1970s, at the start o f the 1990s
Egypt found itself with a budget deficit over 15 percent o f G D P, inflation
over 20 percent, and accum ulation o f arrears on external debt service. T he
stabilization effort included fiscal adjustm ent, anchoring exchange rate visa-vis US dollar, and liberalization o f credit and exchange m arkets. As
indicated in Figure 12.1, the reform s w ere successful in curbing inflation by
1996, prom pting econom ic grow th and planting the seeds for the eventual
take-off o f the financial market.
The growth spurt that started in 1993 had run out o f steam by 2001,
prom pting another round o f reform s. E gypt’s econom y has undergone a
rem arkable m akeover as result o f the am bitious reform agenda pushed
through by Prim e M inister N az if w ithin a year after he took office in July
2004. T he reform s included low ering the overall tax burden in place o f
individualized tax breaks, sim plifying licensing and tax com pliance
procedures for both individual and corporate taxpayers, including the
creation o f one-stop shops for investors in m ajor urban centers.3 O ther
reform m easures included anti-trust legislation and di vesture o f governm ent
stakes in banks and enterprises. Figure 12.1 shows dram atic im provem ent in
all m acroeconom ic indicators after 2004, w hich w as particularly explosive
for foreign direct investm ents and financial m arket capitalization.
H ow ever, am idst all those econom ic successes, the country has been
m oving much more slow ly in the area o f public service delivery. For
exam ple, w hile Egypt has achieved a dram atic im provem ent in literacy rates
from under 50 percent in 1986 to m ore than 70 percent in 2005, it still ranks
125 out o f 164 countries (W D I, 2007). T he lack o f transparency and
com prehensive strategy in the provision o f healthcare results in local
residents seeking private alternatives, w hich often involve th e sam e doctors
as in the public clinics and is often provided on the sam e public premises.
A s a result m ore than h alf o f healthcare financing com es out o f patients’
pockets (W orld Bank, 2006a).4
O ne o f the most telling indications that local affairs have been
m ism anaged under the present system is the inefficient urban growth in
term s o f the use o f the scarce arable land. T he share o f rural population has
rem ained at about 60 percent since the 1960s. H ow ever, both rural and
urban population m ore than doubled since the 1960s. Furtherm ore, both
urban and rural populations huddle on a strip o f arable land alo n g the river
Nile. T he national goal o f land reclam ation, including building new urban
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Figure 12.1 Evolution o f Macro-economic Indicators
Source: Prepared by authors using data reported in WDI (2007).
Notes: Inflation and GDP growth should be read off the primary vertical axis; FD1
and stock market capitalization should be read off the secondary vertical axis.
settlem ents, has had limited success. Besides concentrating in arable lands,
urban growth rem ains largely uncontrolled, taking out o f agricultural use
m ore land than is necessary. It is estim ated that by 2025 h alf o f E gypt’s
arable land will be lost to inform al settlem ents (HD R, 2004). The rate o f
illegal construction has exceeded that for authorized developm ent. For
exam ple, over 1976-1996 the Cairo population in squatter settlem ents grew
at an annual rate o f 8 percent com pared to 4 percent grow th in planned areas
o f the city (H D R , 2005).
It is w ithin this broad fram ework o f econom ic m odernization reaching
out to the subnational governm ent units that decentralization reform has
been pitched by reform ers within E gypt's political establishm ent inside the
N D P and G overnm ent. The statem ent o f the cabinet delivered to the
People’s A ssem bly in a session held on D ecem ber 19, 2004 by Prim e
M inister A hm ad N azeef em phasized “deepening decentralization and
enhancing com m unity partnership, through expanding in transferring the
com petences o f the departm ents and m inistries to the governorates, and
boosting the pow ers o f the governors in adm inistrating the utilities and
appointing the senior officials, with giving the governorates m ore flexibility
in deciding its developm ent requirem ent, and participating in preparing
public budget o f th e state, and delegating them in m anaging expenses o f
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certain item s o f the budgets, w hich are linked to operation, m aintenance and
services.”
He called for activating the role o f th e local popular councils in control
Junctions, to reach som e balance betw een the local executives and local
elected councils, giving the latter a bigger part in preparing plans and
m onitoring their im plem entation. President M ubarak endorsed th e principle
o f “D ecentralization for D em ocracy” in the Presidential M anifesto o f 2005
and reiterated calls for deep decentralization reform s in his recent
speeches.5 Decentralization was also part o f the NDP platform for the
parliam entary elections o f 2005, and at its 9lh annual conference in
N ovem ber 2007, the N D P unveiled in a w orking paper its decentralization
vision.6
A critical difficulty w ith decentralization reform in Egypt is that it is
becom ing increasingly understood that this will not be ju s t another
econom ic reform that can be im plem ented by the G overnm ent within the
existing political institutions. D ecentralization reform will req u ire different
degrees o f dem ocratization and political opening which may facilitate the
em pow erm ent o f the political opposition to the current regime.
The main political risk o f decentralization for the G overnm ent and the
establishm ent within the N D P is the fear o f providing a platform for the
Muslim Brotherhood, an Islam ic m ovem ent with deep roots in Egypt’s
society. W hile technically outlaw ed, the M uslim Brotherhood has been the
main threat to Egypt’s secularism and to the present political regim e for
m any decades. These fears associated with political decentralization are not
unfounded. Since its inception in 1928 the M uslim Brotherhood has been
active at the grass-root level and fairly popular with the poor for its social
work helping citizens obtain food, jo b s, and healthcare and other areas
w here official governm ent institutions have continued to fail to deliver. In
particular, the M uslim Brotherhood has a successful history o f taking over
defunct public institutions and turning them into w ell-functioning bodies
and later using them as a platform for prom oting its cause. T hus in the
1980s, M uslim Brotherhood activists contested elections for many
professional syndicates that had been m arred by “a lack o f transparency, no
clear decision-m aking processes, political infighting, corruption and
financial m ism anagem ent.” (Zahid and M edley, 2006 p. 704). Benefiting
from the discontent o f the syndicates’ m em bership, M uslim Brotherhood
activists w ere able to win election to the boards o f such respected syndicates
as engineers, pharm acists, and lawyers. Their past experience o f
m anagem ent and adm inistration o f resources gained through their grass-root
work allow ed the M uslim Brotherhood to successfully halt m ajor abuses at
the syndicates and turn them into functioning bodies o f civic organization.
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This prompted the governm ent to issues Law 100 o f 1993 effectively
nationalizing the syndicates.
O ther m ore recent events point tow ard th e perception o f a threat from
the M uslim Brotherhood. For exam ple, allegedly an internationally
sponsored project for em pow ering school councils was suspended because
o f suspected M uslim Brotherhood infiltration (Springborg, 2007). In the
2005 national legislative elections, running as independents, the Muslim
Brotherhood won 88 out o f 444 seats com pared to ju st 14 seats won by all
officially-sanctioned opposition parties together. Politicization o f local
governm ent increased with the am endm ents to article 76 o f the
C onstitution, approved in a May 2005 referendum , requiring independent
presidential candidates to obtain at least 140 signatures from m em bers o f
local councils in at least 14 govem orates in order to have their nam e on the
ballot. Local council elections w ere initially scheduled for April 2006, but
the governm ent postponed them follow ing the strong show ing o f Muslim
Brotherhood-affiliated candidates in the national legislative elections in late
2005. When the local elections were finally held in April 2008, the M uslim
Brotherhood undertook trem endous effort to get on the ballot but they
encountered unprecedented difficulties in having their people registered as
candidates and ended up boycotting elections resulting in the lowest voter
turnover ever (less than 5 percent according to Herzallah and Hamzawy,
2008).
A nother political constraint for decentralization is the unw ritten policy
o f zero retrenchm ent o f public em ploym ent. In the past, m any reform
initiatives have failed to overcom e this hurdle, including the perform ance
budgeting introduced in the Planning Law (No. 70 o f 1973) and Budgeting
Law (No. 53 o f 1973). The com m on b elief is that the only politically
feasible solution to the bloated public sector is to allow natural attrition as
the private em ploym ent continues growing. However, given the self
selection o f those staying in the public sector, the ultim ate goal o f
decentralization to improve local services m ight be hard to achieve with the
available workforce.
A lthough the political risks associated with the third rail o f public
em ploym ent and the partial capture o f decentralized governm ents by the
M uslim Brotherhood appear to be quite real, the dilem m a for governm ent
authorities is w hether doing nothing and continuing to go with the status
quo is not as politically risky in the m edium term. But, before getting into
the discussion o f w hat form o f decentralization m ay be both effective and
politically feasible, in the next sections w e take stock o f w hat the current
system o f subnational governm ents is like and w hat will be needed for
change.
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A Strongly H ierarchical V ertical S tructure o f G overnm ent
The vertical structure o f E gypt’s governm ent is com posed o f 29
governorates (27 before 2008) at the first subnational level, about 300
districts (markazes in rural governorates and kisms in urban governorates) at
the second subnational level, over 200 cities ( medinas ) and 1,100 Villages
(quriyat) at the third subnational level. In addition there are over four
thousand unincorporated settlem ents w ithout a council. W ith an average
population size o f about 200,000, the district level ju risdictions appear to be
big enough to provide public services w here there exist econom ies o f scale,
such as w ater treatm ent plants and hospital services. W ith th eir average
population size over 35,000, cities, and to a lesser extent villages, appear to
be also well positioned to provide m ost other local services in a m anner that
is most responsive to local needs; how ever, there are significant deficiencies
in adm inistration capacity at this level, at least in villages.
As show n in Table 12.1, there are significant disparities between the
four groups o f governorates: U rban G overnorates, Lower Egypt, Upper
Egypt, and Frontier G overnorates (see the m ap in Figure 12.2). Urban
governorates are the four largest cities— A lexandria, Cairo, Port Said and
Suez— accounting for 20 percent o f E gypt’s population. T hey all have
socio-econom ic indicators above the national average. Low er Egypt
governorates represent over forty percent o f the national population, located
in the fertile N ile Delta, in the m ost N orthern part o f the country. These are
predom inantly rural areas w ith socio-econom ic indicators around the
national average. U pper Egypt governorates cover ju st over one-third o f the
national population, located south o f Cairo. T hese are predom inantly rural
areas with most unfavorable socio-econom ic indicators. Finally, Frontier
G overnorates cover only 2 percent o f the national population (but 70
percent o f land area) located in Sinai and the deserts that lie w est and east o f
the Nile. These are highly urbanized governorates with above average
socio-econom ic indicators and the lowest poverty rate in the country.
H ow ever, because o f their rem ote location, som e areas in the Frontier
G overnorates lack infrastructure such as access to electricity.
T he current hierarchical vertical structure o f governm ent is largely based
on the 1971 Constitution and Law 43 o f 1979. It should be noted that the
area o f subnational governm ent has experienced a lot o f adm inistrative and
legislative changes over the last several decades. Thus, since 1960 nine laws
have been issued7 and the national agency responsible for local governm ent
has changed its nam e and organizational form num erous tim es. However
the substantive changes that have occurred, if anything, resulted in a w eaker
status for the subnational governm ents. T he m ost sym bolic m anifestation o f
that was the change o f th e nam e o f Law 43 itself from the initial “On Local
G overnm ent” to “On Local A dm inistration” as o f the 1988 am endm ent.
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Figure 12.2 Groups o f Governorates
Source: Prepared by authors.
O nce elected, local executive heads— Omdas in the sub-village level
ham lets— are appointed by the M inister o f Interior since 1994. M oreover, in
1988, local councilors lost the power to hold the executives accountable
through the so-called interpellation procedure. Furtherm ore, there is
universal opinion that the practice o f local adm inistration is far from w hat is
outlined in the current law. As was observed in one study alm ost two
decades ago (M oharram 1992):

Irrespective o f what the law provides, most processes involve
to a great extent informal, personal interactions. These
personal relations are fa r more important in determining what
is achieved, and what is not achieved than the prescribed
form al linkages between the different levels o f the
bureaucracy. This aspect o f informality to a greater extent
introduces random, subjective, and often arbitrary elements
into the decision-making process o f the local government.
Some believe that Sadat got ahead o f him self declaring a new policy for
“dem ocratization and local governance” in the 1970s envisioning elected
local governm ents and appointed governors serving only as representatives
o f th e center (Saw i, 2002). T he subsequent backtracking might be explained
by th e fact that, according to the language o f the 1971 Constitution and
entrenched political culture, all local adm inistration structures are the arm s
o f the central governm ent. The departure o f actual practice from the system
o f local governm ent outlined in the current law makes it difficult to have a

Table 12.1 Regional Social, Economic and Demographic Conditions
Descriptive Statistics

Urbanizatio
Rate

Pop.
Density,
persons per
1000 sq km

GDP

Poverty

EGP per
capita

%

Sewerage

Piped water

Electricity

share of households with services

URBAN GOVERNORA TES
Average

0.98

10.96

10,950

7.73

0.90

0.98

0.99

Minimum

0.94

0.06

10,156

4.30

0.89

0.94

0.97

Maximum

1.00

40.89

13,419

8.80

0.92

1.00

1.00

LOWER EGYPT
396

Average

0.30

1.46

5,598

12.59

0.58

0.97

0.99

Minimum

0.19

0.19

4,638

4.40

0.25

0.92

0.99

Maximum

0.45

3.95

6,933

28.80

0.86

1.00

1.00

Average

0.32

2.16

4,417

0.28

0.19

1.18

3,337

0.12

0.85
0.00

0.99

Minimum

32.30
12.50

Maximum

0.64

5.27

6,825

61.00

0.70

1.00

0.99

Average
Minimum

0.65
0.48

0.90
0.01

8,401
6,296

5.40
-

0.47
0.24

0.86
0.76

0.91
0.87

Maximum

0.96

4.05

12,819

0.69

0.99

0.99

UPPER EGYPT
0.99

FRONTIER GOVERNORATES

-

Table 12.1 Regional Social, Economic and Demographic Conditions (continued)
Descriptive Statistics

Urbanizatio
Rate

Pop.
Density,
persons per
1000 sq km

GDP

Poverty

EGP per
capita

%

Sewerage

Piped water

Electricity

share of households with services

ALL GOVERNORATES
3,337

19.77
4.30

0.61
0.24

0.91
0.00

0.97
0.87

13,419

61.00

0.92

1.00

1.00

0.33

0.81

-0.49

0.58

-0.13

-0.27

1.00

0.31

-0.21

0.29

0.01

0.14

-0.59

0.69

-0.08

-0.37

0.47
0.19

3.00
0.01

6,516

1.00

40.89

Urban. Rate

1.00

Pop. Density

0.33

Average
Minimum
Maximum
Correlation Matrix

397

GDP per capita

0.81

0.31

1.00

Poverty

-0.49

-0.21

-0.59

1.00

-0.80

0.00

-0.37

0.58

0.29

0.69

-0.80

1.00

-0.04

0.15

1.00

0.22

0.22

1.00

Sewerage
Piped water

-0.13

0.01

-0.08

0.00

-0.04

Electricity

-0.27

0.14

-0.37

-0.37

0.15

Source: Computed by authors based on the 2006 Census Data.
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clear picture o f E gypt’s local governm ent not only for foreign scholars but
for the G overnm ent o f Egypt itself, w hich appears m any tim es to be
navigating its journey tow ards decentralization by w ay o f “touch and feel.”
C urrently, at each subnational level, there is an elected representative
organ (Local Popular Council or LPC) and the centrally appointed executive
branch. T he local executives are m ade up o f the local h ead ’s secretariat
(Diwan) and deconcentrated offices (called ‘service directorates’) o f
tw elve central governm ent m inistries or agencies, som etim es reaching two
or m ore subnational levels. T hree central agencies have directorates at the
governorate level only: T ransportations and Roads, Property T axation,
O rganization and A dm inistration. With the exception o f property taxation,
these functions involve spillover o f benefits across district borders and
econom ies o f scale. Four agencies have directorates at the governorate level
and departm ents at the district level: V eterinary, Trade, Labor, Youth and
Sports. Four agencies are represented at all three levels (governorate,
district, and village): Education, H ealth, A griculture and Housing. Finally,
one agency, Social A ffairs, has offices at the governorate and village level
but not at the district level.
The service directors form a m anagem ent group called the Local
E xecutive Council (LEC ), w hich replaced previous Soviet-style “executive
com m ittees.” The LEC is form ally chaired by the appointed executive head:
governorate LECs form ally chaired by governors appointed by the
President, city LECs form ally chaired by m ayors appointed by the Prime
M inister, district LECs form ally chaired by district heads appointed by the
governors and so on. H ow ever, reportedly there is a lack o f a legal basis for
horizontal coordination w ithin the executive branch and often there is m ore
accountability o f service directors along the sectoral hierarchy than to the
governor/m ayor. Essentially the local executive head (G overnor/M ayor) has
substantial authority over the finances and personnel only o f his own
secretariat (D iw an), w hich is sim ilar to the pow ers o f the service directors
over the finances and personnel in their respective sectors.
In addition to service directorates, public holding com panies for public
utilities, such as w ater supply and w astew ater treatm ent, have operating
com panies at governorate levels but there is no direct oversight o f the
operating com panies by governors or governorate LPCs.
T he local adm inistration system is hierarchical am ong local units or
betw een local units and the central governm ent. In other w ords, the LPCs at
higher levels have the right to supervise and m onitor the low er level LPCs.
T hey also have the right to approve or object to decisions taken at lower
levels. Sim ilar hierarchical supervision is exercised by the executive heads
in their hierarchical relations w ith each other and with the central
governm ent.
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T he LPCs have only the right to ask questions or request inform ation
from the head and m em bers o f LECs, but they do not have the right to
interrogate the LECs and thus cannot rem ove them from office or even
recom m end that to the central governm ent. By contrast, the heads o f local
units have the right to object to the decisions o f the LPC s if there is
violation o f the plan, approved budget, laws or regulations.8 In this case, the
governor or the m ayor m ay return the decision to the council, which issued
it, accom panied by his com m ents and the basis o f objection within 15 days
from the date the decision was issued. I f the govem orate LPC insists on its
decision, the issue is referred to the Prime Minister. If the decision objected
to is issued by the LPC at the sub-govem orate level, the issue is referred to
the M inister o f Local D evelopm ent after the head o f the g ovem orate LPC is
inform ed by the governor. The objected decision m ust be settled, at least in
theory, w ithin 30 days from the date it w as presented to the Prim e M inister
or the M inister o f Local Development. T heir decision will be final.
Legislation on local adm inistration requires election o f ten councilors
from each constituent unit resulting in an unm anageably large size o f the
elected council. T hus Cairo, divided into 36 districts, has a council o f 360
m em bers. C urrently LPCs are dom inated by governm ent em ployees. T his is
likely to create a conflict o f interest because supervision o f the executive
branch by local councilors would essentially m ean supervising their own
em ployers (Springborg, 2007).
Several im portant features o f the Egyptian budgeting process bear a
close resem blance to the Soviet “m atroshka” model in which some
subnational budgets are nested into larger ones in a relationship o f vertical
fiscal dependency allow ing for different degrees o f fiscal discretion. T his
discrepancy is due to that fact that the higher-level governm ent only
controls budgetary appropriations aggregated for all units at the level
im m ediately below. For exam ple, for each govem orate the national
governm ent approves appropriations by item for the com posite o f the
govem orate governm ent itself and the sum o f all districts in that
govem orate. Sim ilarly, w hen it com es to budget reporting, the national
governm ent receives inform ation on the sum o f the govem orate and district
spending. This clearly allow s govem orate authorities one important
dim ension o f discretion; for exam ple, if the governor decides not to pass on
any part o f the petrol appropriations to the district level instead spending it
entirely on the govem orate headquarters car fleet, the M inistry o f Finance
w ould not know it from the reported budget allocations. In addition, the
G overnor (or govem orate service director) has substantial discretion in
allocating funds am ong adm inistrative units at the level im m ediately below.
T he hierarchical/dual subordination takes on different configurations
w ith respect to different governm ent decisions. For exam ple, during budget
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planning, budget requests from service directorates are consolidated at the
governorate level, and after formal approval by the governorate LPC, sent
to or negotiated with th e M inistry o f Finance. T hus line m inistries are at
best inform ed about budget requests from their deconcentrated directorates
but are not actively involved in budget negotiations. The o nly input o f the
line m inistries to budgeting by their deconcentrated units are norm s such as
teacher-pupil ratios and num ber o f textbooks (W orld Bank, 2005b).
W hen it com es to budget execution, disbursem ents are m ade directly to
the accounts o f service directorates and the G overnor has no formal
authority over sectoral funds but only over the funds o f his own secretariat.
H ow ever, the G overnor does have to sign o ff on the service directors’
requests to reallocate their resources within the narrow budget categories
before these requests can be subm itted to the M inistry o f Finance. Even the
formal budget holders (i.e. service directors and the executive heads) w hile
enjoying som e discretion in allocating funds am ong low er-level units have
little flexibility in shifting funds am ong budget categories once th e budget is
approved. Shifting o f funds am ong econom ic categories, for exam ple from
wages to m aterial supplies, requires parliam entary approval. Shifting items
am ong main sub-categories, for exam ple from basic wages to supplem ental
allow ances, requires approval o f the M inistry o f Finance (or M inistry o f
Econom ic D evelopm ent in th e case o f capital expenditures). G overnors and
local heads can authorize m oving resources only within narrow er sub
categories o f expenditures.
T he personnel m atters o f service directorates (appointm ent, prom otion,
transfer) are entirely in the purview o f line m inistries with the final approval
by th e Central A gency for O rganization and A dm inistration (CA O A). At
the sam e tim e, the w age bill accounts for 93 percent o f th e directorates'
budgets. Im portantly, this budget for labor services is essentially pre
determ ined by the num ber and type o f posts and their rem uneration set by
the CA O A . By contrast, in the budgets o f executive h ead s’ secretariats
( Diwans ), over w hich the latter have operational control, personnel costs
account for less than one-third and thus allow s m ore flexibility in spending.
In fact non-w age budget o f the heads’ secretariats is alm ost double o f that
o f the tw elve service directorates put together. Furtherm ore, the non-w age
budget o f all service directorates is less than the extra-budgetary resources,
over w hich governors have essentially full control. E xtra-budgetary funds
can be used for: 1) budget shortages (except w ages), 2) service
im provem ent (e.g. com puterization o f service directorates), an d 3) capital
projects.
Essentially, extra-budgetary accounts are the only available vehicle for
exercising m eaningful local self-governm ent. For exam ple, villages do not
have their own budget or a budgetary account - their expenses are part o f
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the district budget. However, villages can and do establish extra-budgetary
accounts, w hich they m anage independently; they keep a record o f all
account transactions, w hich they periodically send to the district finance
departm ent, w here they are counted as part o f the district budget report.
Extra-budgetary resources represent on average less than 5 percent o f the
total local spending but alm ost a quarter o f non-w age expenditures.

DECONCENTRATED EXPENDITURE
RESPO N SIBILITIES WITH LOW DISCRETION
T he assignm ent o f expenditure responsibilities at different levels o f
governm ents is, for the m ost part, unclear. The closest resem blance to a
form al assignm ent o f expenditure responsibilities can be found in Law 43 o f
1979 on Local A dm inistration. H ow ever, the references to specific
functions are scattered all over the text o f this law. For exam ple. A rticle 25
establishes responsibility o f governors for food security, efficiency o f
agricultural and industrial production, security, m orals, and public values.
For districts and tow ns, other than internal m anagem ent, the Law only
m entions “establishing various services for the benefit o f local populations”
and regulating public utilities. Village Executive C ouncils are entrusted
w ith collecting revenues and surveying public dem and for services and
projects. In a num ber o f occasions, the legislation assigns the sam e function
to several levels o f governm ent. Thus, for example, it stipulates that local
authorities “take charge o f establishing and adm inistering all public services
in their territory” (A rticle 2). H ow ever, for exam ple, collecting solid waste
in a given neighborhood takes place in the territory o f a certain town quarter
council, town council, district council, and govem orate council. Then,
w hich o f the four authorities is in charge? Saying that all the four are
responsible m ay sim ply im ply that nobody is responsible in particular.
H ow ever, overlapping responsibilities is one o f the main features o f the
“ m atroshka” model. G iven the vagueness o f the law, it is im possible to map
form al expenditure assignm ent by level o f governm ent. O ne could establish
the actual assignm ent by looking at the actual expenditures by level o f
governm ent. H ow ever, given the current form o f budget reporting, it is
im possible to disaggregate subnational expenditures into the govem orate
and sub-governorate parts due to nesting o f budgets. W e have to lim it our
assessm ent to the division o f expenditures into the national and subnational
parts.
In practice, the ongoing assignm ent o f expenditure responsibilities gets
reflected in a changing picture o f public sector expenditures. As shown in
Figure 12.3, E gypt's public sector has been declining as percent o f G D P—
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Figure 12.3 Evolution o f E g yp t’s Budgetary Expenditures, % o f GDP
Notes: Prepared by authors based on the IMF’s GFS data.
with a short break in 2001— since the stabilization effort o f the early 1990s.
Thus, relative to G D P, total public expenditures dropped from over 35
percent in 1992 to 30 percent in 2006. T he reduction occurred in all sectors
except for the cases o f public order and healthcare, both o f which
experienced m arginal increases. H ow ever, one sector, social protection, has
had an explosive grow th from less than 1 percent o f GDP in 2001 to more
than 9 percent in 2006. M ore than 99 percent o f these expenses are
subsidies, m ostly for fuel and food. E xpenditures other than those on social
protection dropped from over 26 percent in 2001 to 21 percent in 2006.
D econcentrated expenditures (those flow ing through Diwans and service
directorates) account for about 5 percent o f G D P (Table 12.2). M oreover,
the bulk (80 percent) o f it is accounted for by ju st tw o functions: general
public adm inistration and education, and m ost o f these expenditures are for
wages and salaries. N ote that for the local h ead s’ secretariats ( Diwans ,
classified as general public adm inistration), the total budgeted am ount
is about 25 percent less than the actual expenditures in the previous
years (Table 12.2). T he reason is that budget plans do not fully account for
projects financed through extra-budgetary accounts w hile the final budget
reports do incorporate those expenditures as they occur. T his is not
observed for other deconcentrated budget holders because m ost user fees
and other project revenues are channeled to the extra-budgetary accounts
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Table 12.2 Deconcentrated Budgetary Expenditures, % o f GDP
A ctual
2002/03

Actual
2003/04

A ctual
2004/05

Budgeted
2005/06

Budgeted
2006/07

General Public Services

1.44

1.62

2.00

1.29

1.26

Defense

0 .0 0

0 .0 0

0 .0 0

0 .0 0

0 .0 0

Public Order And Safety

0 .0 0

0 .0 0

0 .0 0

0 .0 0

0 .0 0

Economic Affairs
Environmental
Protection
Housing and Community
Amenities
Health
Recreation, Culture, and
Religion
Education

0.36

0.33

0.32

0.32

0.32

0 .0 0

0 .0 0

0 .0 0

0 .0 0

0 .0 0

0.06

0.05

0.05

0.04

0.04

0.64

0.67

0.67

0.49

0.49

0.08

0.07

0.07

0.07

0.07

2.64

2.49

2.50

2.34

2.41

Social Protection

0.10

0.09

0.09

0.08

0.08

Total

5.33

5.32

5.71

4.64

4.67

Source: Computed by authors based on National Budget data from FY 06/07.
controlled by th e executive heads as opposed to service directors.
N otw ithstanding the overall reduction o f the total public sector expenditures
occurring since 2001, the notable trend in actual expenditures at the the
subnational level is an increase o f general public expenditures as a share o f
G D P, growing alm ost 40 percent between 2003 and 2005.
For all deconcentrated offices except Diwans, housing, and social
protection, expenditures on m aterial supplies and capital expenditures have
been less decentralized than payroll (Table 12.3). At the sam e time,
personnel establishm ents and rem uneration are tightly controlled by the
C entral A gency for O rganization and A dm inistration (CA O A). Essentially,
service directorates act as a post office forw arding paychecks.
W hile for D iwans , the allocations on wages and m aterial supplies are
roughly equal, for service directorates m aterial supplies are less than onefifth o f their w age bill in FY 2006/07 (Figure 12.4). M oham ed El Shawi
(2007) reports that, for the subnational executive h ead s’ secretariats,
m aterial costs exceeded payroll by a factor o f 3 in 2004/05 (by a factor o f 2
in 2003/04), w hile, for service directorates, material costs am ounted to less
than 8 percent o f the wage bill in 2004/05 and in 2003/04. Thus the bloated
sta ff o f service directorates is likely to be quite unproductive w ithout
adequate m aterial supply. In addition to lacking m aterial supplies, the
deconcentrated public w orkforce also appears underpaid. Thus, w hile 58
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percent o f the public w orkforce is located at the subnational level, it
accounts for only 47 percent o f the public w age bill as o f 2007 (N D P,
2007).
M ore than one-third o f the budget o f local executive h ead s’ secretariats
is allocated tow ards capital expenditures. This is due to capital grants from
the M inistry o f Econom ic D evelopm ent (form erly M inistry o f Planning)
allocated based on a form ula w eighing population and HDIs (W orld Bank,
2005b). Local capital projects are also financed from extra-budgetary funds
controlled by the executive heads.
For budgetary accounts, local authorities have no pow ers to shift funds
across budget items or to the next fiscal year. A ny surplus at th e end o f the
year has to be returned to the state treasury. By contrast, for extra-budgetary
funds, local authorities have discretion over how to use the resources and
are also entitled to keep any surplus at the end o f the fiscal year.
T here are persistent disparities in per capita expenditures am ong
governorates. Thus, in per capita term s frontier governorates spend m ore
than tw ice th e national average expenditures on general governm ent
services possibly due to low er population density (Table 12.4). At the sam e
time, governorates in U pper and Lower Egypt spend only tw o thirds o f the
national average in per capita term s.
Sim ilarly for education, governorates in U pper and Low er Egypt have
less than the average am ount o f per capita resources w h ile frontier
governorates spend alm ost tw ice the national average (Table 12.5). At the
sam e tim e governorates face very different challenges in the area o f
education. T hus the U pper Egypt governorates have the lowest drop-out rate
but the highest share o f children never enrolled in school. L ow er Egypt has
the highest drop-out rate but the share o f never-enrolled is below the
national average.
In healthcare, frontier governorates have the best health status and at the
sam e tim e four-fold the per-capita healthcare spending an d twice the
national average o f public hospital capacity per capita (Table 12.6). With
only 2 percent o f the national population, higher per capita spending does
not take aw ay too m uch from other governorates but dem onstrates that
adequate funding m akes a difference in health outcomes. On the other hand,
Upper Egypt had the worst health outcom es and the lowest public hospital
capacity.

Table 12.3 Deconcentrated Share o f Expenditures by Budget Function, % o f Budgeted Amount

Function
General Public Services

out o f which:
Executive and Legislative organs
Financial and fiscal affairs
R & D General Public Services
Defense

Staff

Goods
And
Services

Interest

Subsidies

Other
current

Capital

Total

30

53

0

5

3

50

12

92
18
100

99

100

99

18

99

6
100

0
0

0
100

0
100

0
0

95
12
100

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0
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Public Order And Safety

0

0

0

0

0

Economic Affairs

50

4

0

0

1

0

19

54

12

0

0

/

0

14

81
78

58
40

0
0

3
4

0
0

71
71

92
67

21
4

0
0

24
74

83
2
22
2

0
0

73
16

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

out o f which:
General Economic and
Commercial Affairs
General Labor Affairs
Agriculture
Veterinary
Road Transport
Environmental Protection

Table 12.3 Deconcentrated Share o f Expenditures by Budget Function, % o f Budgeted Amount (continued)

Function
Housing and Community
Amenities

Staff

Goods
And
Services

Interest

Subsidies

Other
current

Capital

Total

65

31

0

8

7

0

7

97

96

0

96

88

0

85

57

28

0

1

2

0

35

72

42

1

86

4

0

61

8

1

0

17

0

0

6

91

59

0

42

43

0

62

0

59

0

87

out o f which:
Housing Development
Health

out o f which:
406

General Hospitals Services
Recreation, Culture, and Religion

out o f which:
Sporting Services
Education

out o f which:
Pre - University Education
Social Protection
Total

74

18

0

6

0

96

28

0

20

71

84

47

0

0

3

0

1

26

0

0

0

14

15

47

Source: Computed by authors based on National Budget data from FY 06/07.
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Table 12.4 Disparities in p er capita Allocations on General Public
Services, EGP p er Capital
A ctual
02/03

A ctual
03/04

A ctual
04/05

Budgeted
05/06

Budgeted
06/07

Average

141.10

162.52

198.91

169.32

178.93

Minimum
Maximum

49.39
304.71

50.88
344.68

115.79
380.77

56.92
392.89

57.23
401.24

84.42
56.71
135.92

117.24

154.60
99.39
264.57

118.13
75.17
179.35

125.87

73.25
205.65

URBAN GO VERNORA TES

LOW ER EG YPT
Average
Minimum
Maximum

80.57
189.38

UPPER EGYPT
88.60

119.66

166.18

119.40

128.96

41.04
180.00

68.74
238.30

109.57
358.79

60.95
208.41

71.83
231.47

FRONTIER GOVERNORATES
369.89
Average
M inimum
211.12
M aximum
565.39

475.77
350.55
638.47

585.59
362.04
766.36

401.99
301.59
468.03

439.74
330.86
505.96

ALL GOVERNORATES
Average

147.08

191.15

244.84

178.71

192.88

Minimum
M aximum

41.04
565.39

50.88
638.47

99.39

56.92
468.03

57.23
505.96

Average
Minimum
Maximum

766.36

Source: Computed by authors based on National Budget Data from 06/07

Table 12.5 Regional Variations in Educational Allocations and Educational Inputs
Region

E nrollm ent

D ropouts

N ever
enrolled

% o f SAC population

SAC

Budgeted per
capita

B udgeted per
SAC

B udgeted p er
pupil

% of
population

EGP

EGP

EGP

URBAN GO VERNORA TES
3.1%

21.6%

1.1%

1.8%

20.4%

175

828

886

2.8%

4.6%

23.7%

451

2,128

2,192

2.8%

3.7%

23.5%

259

1,101

1,176

2.0%

2.1%

22.5%

186

786

868

95.1%

4.1%

6.5%

24.8%

391

1,706

1,818

Average

90.5%

2.0%

7.4%

26.5%

225

855

936

Minimum

85.5%

0.7%

2.9%

23.2%

122

524

568

Average

94.8%

Minimum

93.3%

Maximum

97.1%

Average

93.5%

Minimum

90.6%

Maximum

2.1%

274

1,269

1,330

HOP

LOW ER EG YPT

UPPER EGYPT

Maximum

96.4%

3.5%

11.0%

28.1%

350

1,436

1,490

2,381

FRONTIER G OV ERNORATES
Average

90.8%

2.7%

6.4%

22.2%

471

2,195

Minimum

82.7%

0.9%

1.9%

12.8%

240

840

1,015

Maximum

97.2%

5.2%

12.1%

28.6%

876

3,567

3,670

Table 12.5 Regional Variations in Educational Allocations and Educational Inputs (continued)
Region

E nrollm ent

D ropouts

N ever
enrolled

% o f SAC population

SAC

Budgeted per
capita

Budgeted per
SAC

B udgeted p er
pupil

% of
population

EGP

EGP

EGP

ALL GOVERNORATES
Average
Minimum
M aximum

92.2%
82.7%
97.2%

24.0%

289

1,246

0.7%

1.8%

12.8%

122

524

568

5.2%

12.1%

28.6%

876

3,567

3,670

Source: Computed by authors based on data from 2006 Census and 06/07 National Budget.
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Note: SAC school-aged child

1,342

5.4%

2.4%

Table 12.6 Regional Variations in Healthcare Allocations and Outcomes
Infant
m ortality

<5
m ortality

M atern al
m ortality

A ttended
birth s

Im m unization

Budgeted
per capita

M OH
beds

MOH/
Total
beds

%

%

EGP

P er 1000
persons

ratio

Region
p er 1000 live birth s
URBAN GO VERNORA TES
Average
M inimum
M aximum

22.58

1.38

73.75

74.58

99.73

39

16

0.49

16.90

0.10

60.00

73.50

99.50

7

11

0.30

90

22

0.69

410

30.60

3.90

90.00

75.50

99.90

15.84

0.97

65.78

73.21

99.54

34

13

0.67

11.50

0.10

46.00

64.70

98.80

8

9

0.54

18.70

1.90

80.00

75.50

99.90

82

21

0.91

27.12

1.52

73.44

71.36

99.62

64

12

0.76

15.60

0.20

54.00

56.50

98.80

7

9

0.51

39.70

2.70

94.00

75.10

99.90

152

24

0.98

16.52

0.06

46.00

70.16

99.18

412

38

0.88

97.20

65

16

0.76

823

72

0.94

LOW ER E G YPT
Average
Minimum
Maximum
UPPER EGYPT
Average
Minimum
Maximum
FRONTIER GO VERNORATES
Average
Minimum
Maximum

9.60
21.50

0.00
0.10

0.00
89.00

63.50
75.20

99.90

Table 12.6 Regional Variations in Healthcare Allocations and Outcomes (continued)
In fan t
m ortality

<5
m ortality

M a tern al
m ortality

A ttended
birth s

Im m unization

Budgeted
p e r capita

MOH
beds

MOH/
T otal
beds

%

%

EGP

P er 1000
persons

ratio

Region
per 1000 live birth s
ALL GO VERNORA TES
Average
Minimum
M aximum

1.04

65.85

72.23

99.53

115

18

0.71

9.60

0.00

0.00

56.50

97.20

7

9

0.30

39.70

3.90

94.00

75.50

99.90

823

72

0.98

20.73

411

Source: Computed by authors based on data from 2006 Census and 06/07 National Budget.
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Figure 12.4 Econom ic Com position o f D econcentrated Expenditures,
B u d g e te d fo r F Y 2006/07
Source: Prepared by authors based on National Budget data from FY 06/07

LOW REVEN U E AUTONOMY
E gypt’s revenue raising effort o f 24.5 percent o f G D P is close to the
average for low -m iddle-incom e countries (26.2 percent) and close to the
w orld average (26.5 percent) according to WDI (2007). H ow ever, m ore
than a third o f that revenue derives from non-tax sources, m ostly
rem ittances from the Egyptian Petroleum Corporation (EG PC) and the Suez
Canal A uthority (SCA). A s o f 2006, tax sources generate about 16 percent
o f G D P out o f which 8 percent o f G D P was accounted for by direct taxes,
5.6 percent o f G D P w as accounted for by taxes on goods and services and
1.6 percent o f G D P was accounted for by taxes on international trade (Table
12.7). T his represents a significant developm ent since 1990 w hen revenues
from indirect taxes outw eighed that o f direct taxes.
W ith the exception o f a few own taxes authorized for the large cities, all
locally-generated revenues com e from centrally introduced taxes. Revenue
sharing with subnational budgets is done both at the point o f collection and
through redistribution via the grant pool. Law 43 o f 1979 (Art. 35, as
am ended by Law 50 o f 1981) decrees h a lf o f shared revenue— structured
as a surtax on certain national taxes— be allocated to the govem orate budget
at the point o f collection: the surtax on exports and imports, the surtax on
financial assets, and surtax on incom e derived from trade and
m anufacturing. The rem aining 50 percent o f the shared revenues are
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Table 12.7 Evolution o f E g y p t’s Budgetary Revenue, % o f GDP
1990

1995

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

T o ta l revenue

19.14

26.95

21.84

20.73

20.67

21.35

20.99

20.59

24.49

T ax revenue

13.19

17.62

14.59

14.32

13.41

13.35

13.84

14.07

15.83

Individual
income tax

0.48

0.56

1.26

1.17

1.73

1.61

1.68

1.73

1.52

Corporate
income lax

3.10

4.78

4.13

4.16

3.45

3.38

3.94

4.13

6.30

Taxes on
property

0.25

0.21

NA

NA

0.20

0.19

0.16

0.19

0.20

Taxes on goods
a n d services

3.12

4.67

5.91

5.80

5.53

5.54

5.47

5.84

5.62

Customs and
other import
duties

3.16

3.60

2.73

2.56

1.90

1.95

1.88

1.42

1.55

G ra n ts from
foreign
governm ents

1.45

0.84

0.52

0.43

0.83

0.56

0.83

0.39

0.28

Non-tax
revenue

4.47

8.32

6.73

5.97

6.14

7.21

6.12

5.99

8.27

out o f which

Source: GFS (2008).
allocated to the com m on grant pool. A ccording to the law, if activities o f a
business establishm ent concentrate in a govem orate different from where
the business headquarters are located, then the tax revenues from this
business is allocated to the former governorate. T he rates o f these surtaxes
have been unstable and have been established in a large body o f norm ative
acts over time. T his m akes it difficult to assess the actual degree o f revenueraising powers o f subnational governm ents in Egypt.
G overnorate Popular Councils determ ine sharing with constituent
localities o f the follow ing revenue: 25 percent o f th e land tax and surtax;
taxes on m otor vehicles and other m eans o f transport licensed by the
governorate.
Law 43 o f 1979 (Art. 51 and 61) decrees revenue from the gam bling and
entertainm ent tax and 75 percent o f th e land tax to be allocated to the
budgets o f tow ns and villages at the point o f collection. In addition, town
budgets are to receive revenues from the tax and surtaxes on buildings (with
the exception o f national surtaxes); betterm ent levies in connection with
public works; taxes on m otorized vehicles and other m eans o f transport
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licensed by the governorate; and revenue from fees out o f the list o f 11 fees
that town councils are authorized to levy. Tow n council resolutions
concerning levies do not take effect until approved by the district popular
council and the governor (Art. 53). I f the town council refuses to m ake
changes proposed by th e governor, the m atter is referred to the governorate
popular council, and if not resolved then to the Cabinet, w hose decision is
final. Concession for public utilities/services and extraction o f natural
resources (except oil and mineral resources) can be given only with the
approval o f the respective popular council, that is governorate LPC, district
LPC, and so on (Art. 129). The Law refers to executive regulations for the
assessm ent o f local taxes and the appeal procedure (A rt 125). It allow s the
executive regulations to provide a m enu o f m ethods for the local popular
council to choose from. T he collection o f local taxes and tax arrears is
subject to the sam e rules as for national taxes and duties. Local taxes are
collected by the M inistry o f Finance to the national treasury and then
allocated to the local governm ent unit entitled to this revenue.
Law 43 o f 1979 (A rt. 3 6 -3 7 ) allow s creation o f extra-budgetary funds
(also know n as Special D evelopm ent Funds) for land reclam ation and
affordable housing. In addition, the Law allow s G overnorates’ Popular
C ouncils to establish “ A ccount for Services and Local D evelopm ent,”
accum ulating user fees, returns on investm ents o f th e account funds,
donations, and 50 percent o f ow n-sources revenue in excess o f the budget
estim ate. T he extra-budgetary accounts are governed by th e G overnor’s
decree and m anaged by a board chaired by the Governor. Sim ilarly each
district and village is to establish the “A ccount for Services and Local
D evelopm ent” to accum ulate the follow ing revenue: 75 percent o f user fees
im posed according to regulations for the governorate “A ccount for Services
and Local D evelopm ent,” profits from agricultural cooperative societies,
rents, and other returns to investm ents (Art. 70). N ote that apart from the
extra-budgetary funds, districts do not have locally generated revenues. The
account is governed by the G overnor’s decree; Balances in those accounts
roll over from one fiscal year to another but are subject to the sam e financial
m anagem ent rules as the budgetary funds.
In addition to the extra-budgetary funds controlled by the local executive
head, service directorates are also authorized to collect revenues for
“service im provem ent” funds (HDR, 2005). For exam ple, in rural clinics,
uninsured patients have to pay EG P 3 plus one third o f the m edicine costs.9
N om inal fees are also charged for specialized services such as radiology,
dentistry and small surgery.
In practice, the extra-budgetary accounts accum ulate revenue from
various user fees, adm inistrative charges and license fees. T h e schedule o f
fees often includes charges on electricity bills, w ater m eter installation,
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industrial licenses, vehicle and m otorcycle licenses, and construction
p erm its (HDR, 2005). Besides approval by the LPCs, the schedule o f fees
has to be authorized by the Prim e M inister individually for each
govem orate. As a result fees on com parable item s vary widely across
governorates som etim es by a factor o f 200 (El Shaw i, 2007). O ne o f the
reasons is that, once introduced, the fees are not updated frequently. Thus,
in A ssuit G ovem orate the schedule o f fees for the Services and Local
D evelopm ent Fund has not been updated since it w as first introduced in
1983. At the sam e tim e, despite the difference in the tim e o f decreeing, in
2000 and 2006 respectively, the governorates o f Q ena and Beheira have
very sim ilar fee schedules possibly due to that fact that sam e person (Adel
Ali Labib, presently governor o f A lexandria) served as their governor in
those respective tim es periods.
Local revenues from own sources and shared taxes account for less than
a quarter o f total local revenue with the rest m ade up by transfers. It should
be noted that property taxes account for less than 10 percent o f subnational
pre-transfer revenues. In Egypt, property is taxed through three separate tax
instrum ents: A gricultural Land Tax, B uilding Tax, and Real Estate Transfer
Tax. These taxes have rather low yield o f 0.2 percent o f G D P out o f which
0.15 percent o f G D P is accounted for by recurrent taxes (A gricultural Land
T ax and B uilding Tax) and the rem aining 0.05 percent is accounted for by
taxes on property transactions. This is well below the average for lowm iddle-incom e countries (0.42 percent) and the w orld average (0.75
percent) according to Bird and Slack (2004). Just like for other taxes, local
authorities are passive recipients o f property tax revenue without playing
an y role in tax-setting or adm inistration. Reportedly in C airo tax arrears
exceed tax collections by a ratio o f 6:1 (W orld Bank, 2006b). However,
even if Egypt succeeded in raising the revenue yield to the world average,
the property tax could only cover 10 percent o f expenditures o f the
executive head secretariats not including any sectoral expenditure. M otor
vehicle fees have a yield com parable to that o f the building tax; however,
m ore than tw o thirds o f this revenue is collected in ju st three urban
governorates— C airo, A lexandria, and G iza (W orld Bank, 2006b).
A ccording to T able 12.8, extra-budgetary revenue accounts for 3 0 -5 0
percent o f subnational pre-transfer revenue. Extra-budgetary resources are
m ostly spent on m aterial supplies (79 percent). Most o f these resources are
spent by subnational executive h eads’ secretariat as opposed to service
directorates (El Shaw i, 2007). T he am ount and com position o f ex tra
budgetary revenues varies am ong localities. Thus in relatively affluent
Behira govem orate, the bulk o f extra-budgetary resources com es from
revenue-generating projects, such as car parking and vegetable and fruit
projects. By contrast in the relatively poor govem orate o f Assuit, projects
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Table 12.8 Pre-transfer Revenue o f Subnational Government, million EGP
2004/2005
Actual

2005/2006
Budgeted

2006/2007
Budgeted

Sovereign Revenues

Local units share from commercial
and industrial profits taxes

278.1

-

-

Local units share from revenue
retention

269.4

Local units share from the revenue
pool

252.0

472.9

-

Local units share from Suez Canal
revenue

147.0

393.6

-

Agricultural land tax

167.9

178.6

213.0

Building tax

159.2

147.4

188.0

Vehicle fees and tax

137.2

146.4

150.0

Gambling and entertainment tax

44.1

42.8

46.0

Local taxes and fees

70.7

80.7

87.0

Local units share from imports and
exports taxes

-

-

204.8

-

-

1247.5

1945.3

684.0

2.5

208.0

196.0

Extra-budgetary funds

1703.7

1258.4

1338.0

Other current revenues

581.6

690.2

808.0

3535.3

4101.9

3026

Total sovereign revenues

Donations

Total pre-transfer revenue

Source: Mohamed El Shawi (2007).
Note: Sovereign revenues include local taxes and fees and local retention of some
national taxes. The sharp drop in sovereign revenues in 2006/07 budgets compared
to the FY 2005/06 figures is due to inability of local budgets to plan for some of the
shared revenue. If these omitted revenue sources were added to the budget, the total
sovereign revenue would increase to EGP 2.033 million. In FY 2005/06 revenue
retention from profit taxes and import and export taxes are reported jointly.
contribute only one third o f extra-budgetary revenue with th e rest com ing
from property transfer fee, construction perm its, and housing rents.
T he potential for m obilizing local resources for projects with tangible
local benefits is dem onstrated by the national program for integrated rural
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developm ent “ Shorouk.” This initiative prom otes dem and-driven projects
w ith popular participation in term s o f initiating, planning, financing,
im plem enting and evaluating local developm ent. Even in the relatively poor
governorate o f A ssuit, local com m unities contributed m ore than a quarter o f
the project costs (El Shaw i, 2007).
C ounter-equalizing Transfers
Technically we can identify transfers only with respect to the secretariat o f
the local executive heads (Diwans). Service directorates have no own
revenues and are essentially funded from the national budget pretty much
the sam e w ay as their sectoral head-offices in Cairo. H ow ever, with respect
to capital projects, there are reports that the M inistry o f Education has
experim ented with some kind o f lum p-sum capital grants to education
directorates w ithout earm arking for any specific site or type o f school.
(W orld Bank, 2005b). However, in the 2006/07 budget, zero capital
expenses w ere planned for education directorates (Table 12.3).
In the case o f Diwans , w e can exam ine tw o channels o f
intergovernm ental transfers. First, it is the distribution o f funds accum ulated
from h a lf o f shared revenue from special surtaxes on imports/exports,
investm ent security holdings, and income derived from trade or
m anufacturing. T his pool o f funds, referred to as the “Joint Revenue Fund”
initially operated as an extra-budgetary fund controlled by the M inistry o f
Local D evelopm ent (Sawi, 2002). T he M inistry o f F inance would sign o ff
on the distribution o f the “Joint R evenue Fund” as long as funded project
proposals subm itted by local authorities had been approved by the M inistry
o f Planning (now the M inistry o f Econom ic D evelopm ent) and included in
th e Plan. The distribution o f this com m on pool is governed by a resolution
o f the M inister for Local Development.
In the early 2000s, the Joint Fund w as distributed am ong governorates
excluding C airo and A lexandria according to a form ula w eighing in
population, land area and need (W orld Bank, 2006b). Transfers from the
“Joint Revenue Fund” account for less than 3 percent o f th e resources o f the
executive h ea d s’ secretariats. Reportedly, recently governorates have started
receiving capital grants from the M inistry o f Econom ic D evelopm ent
(form erly M inistry o f Planning) based on a form ula w eighing in population
and HDIs. It is unclear w hether this formula applies to the “Joint Revenue
Fund.” Sim ilarly, the revenue from the Suez Canal surtax is used to fund
projects approved by the M inistry o f Econom ic D evelopm ent and
distributed am ong the five governorates surrounding the Canal in the
follow ing proportion: 50 percent to Ismailia, 30 percent to Port Said and
Suez, and 10 percent each to North and South Sinai. These revenues
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account for less than 20 percent o f total resources o f executive h ead s’
secretariats in those five governorates.
The second channel o f transfers for the secretariat o f the local executive
heads is essentially filling the gap between the budgeted current
expenditures and the estim ated revenue from own sources and shared taxes.
The gap-filling approach also applies to capital grants as reportedly the
balance o f extra-budgetary funds from the previous year is deducted by the
M inistry o f Finance before allocating financing for th e approved local
capital projects.
As can be seen in T able 12.9 the allocation o f intergovernm ental
revenue m oderately im proves disparities am ong governorates. Thus, the
coefficient o f variation in per capita expenditures on general public services
by Diwans (0.83) is only slightly less than the coefficient o f variation in per
capita pre-transfer revenue (1.05). T he coefficient o f variation in per capita
expenditures on healthcare services is 50 percent higher than o f that for per
capita pre-transfer revenue. O nly for education is inequality in per capita
expenditures significantly low er than for per capita pre-transfer revenue.
T his is not surprising given that per capita am ounts o f ow n-source revenues
are positively correlated with per capita am ounts o f both recurrent and
capital transfers, with correlation coefficients o f 0.18 and 0.74 respectively.

Borrowing
The existing legislation does not rule out subnational borrow ing. Thus, Law
43 o f 1979 (Art. 12 as am ended by Law 50 o f 1981) gives govem orate
popular councils the pow er to borrow w ithin the plan lim its and authorized
budget, provided that total indebtedness does not exceed 40 percent o f their
own revenue. T he Law does not allow local governm ent u nits to assum e
debt or an y other liabilities leading to future expenses other than those in
connection with a project included in the plan or budget approved by the
national parliam ent. T he inform ation on the actual level o f indebtedness is
not available but the am ount for subnational interest expenses budgeted in
FY 2006/07 was under 3 percent o f the budget o f the executive h ead s’
secretariats.
A ssessm ent: A m biguity and Lack o f A utonom y as A W ay o f
C onducting Business
Practically every aspect o f intergovernm ental relations in E gypt seem s to
suffer from a lack o f clarity and from general vagueness. A nd it is not only
foreign observers w ho have difficulties getting a clear picture o f how
E gypt’s subnational system o f finance really w orks. O ften, the G overnm ent
o f Egypt itself appears to navigate its jo u rn ey tow ards decentralization by

Table 12.9 Disparity in Subnational Revenue and Expenditures. FY 2003/04. EGP per capita
Governorate

Pre-transfer
revenues

Current
Transfers

Education
expenditures

Healthcare
expenditures

Capital
Transfers

Secretariat
expenditures

253
216
212

83
382
47

Red Sea
South Sinai

319
326

339
340

128
33

Suez

150
142
31
188

310

29

596
638
147

323
133
554

18
7
37

206
69
345

201
88
354

60
9
202

59
61

145
398

7
11

51
238

133
207

21
133

83
63
46

337
236
224

46
18
44

351
124
107

185

746

34
66
33

211
403
230

11
12
4

126
175
90

142
159
121

49
125
30
32
37

431
786

11
20

158

6
9
88
158
22
71

216
249
254

3
4
11

37

332

17

lsmailia
Giza
Port Said
Cairo
Luxor
Matrouh
Behera
Alexandria
Fayoum
Aswan
Menia
Damietta
North Sinai
Kalyoubia
Suhag
Beni Suef
Menoufia

386
73
84
104
97

238
154
262
446
136
172
143
195

422
25
12
56
32

Table 12.9 Disparity in Subnational Revenue and Expenditures. FY 2003/04. EGP per capita (continued)
Governorate

Pre-transfer
revenues

Current
Transfers

Capital
Transfers

Secretariat
expenditures

515
58

86
112

225

21

191
51
638
0.83

213
88
641
0.53

123
6
746
1.48

59
29

1.095
276

21
14

409
95

Gharbia
Asyout
Qena

33
23
25

342
257
291

10
6
6

105
89
100

Shark ia

20
26

295
360

15
9

79
20
326
1.05

347
133
1.095
0.57

21
3
128
1.20

Average
Minimum
Maximum
Coef. of Variati on

Healthcare
expenditures

641
158
194
143
185
191

El Wadi El Gidid
Kafr ElSheikh

Dakahlia

Education
expenditures

Source: Computed by authors based on data from 06/07 National Budget.and Mohamed El Shawi (2007).

8
33
71
31
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w ay o f “touch and feel.” Currently, the inform ation available in Egypt on
the behavior o f subnational governm ents would seem to be largely
inadequate to inform policy m akers about the true situation regarding
subnational fiscal accounts and the conditions o f service delivery. T his
overall am biguity led som e scholars to believe that there are, “in reality, no
local governm ents in Egypt, only local outposts o f the central governm ent.”
(Thirsk and M artinez-V azquez, 2007). T he all pervasive am biguity is likely
to be the outcom e o f an explicit policy design and has several main
m anifestations. T he first source o f am biguity is in the relationships and
direction o f accountability between a locally elected people’s council (LPC)
and an appointed local executive council (LE C ) operating at every
subnational level o f governm ent. T he LEC prepares and executes the local
budget and is responsible for the quantity and quality o f local public
services that are provided. But their accountability is practically only to the
central governm ent hierarchy that em ploys them , as opposed to the elected
councils they are supposed to serve. T hat is w hat happens in practice.
Formally, the lines o f accountability are not very clearly established in the
law. Although higher level popular councils have supervisory authority over
the lower-level popular councils, they have no authority over the executive
branch at the sam e level (the LECs), especially since the abolishm ent o f the
interpellation clause in 1988.
U nder the interpellation procedure, one third or more o f council
m em bers could subm it interpellation concerning the heads o f local units,
chairm en o f executive agencies, and public authorities w orking in the
jurisdiction. T he subm ission proceeded to a perm anent com m ission that had
to include representatives o f the higher level popular and executive
councils. T he com m ittee had to report its findings to the council and if twothirds approved, the governor was inform ed and had to refer the m atter to
investigative authorities. However, the 1988 am endm ent elim inated this
clause (Art. 106-BIS) from Law 43.
A second source o f am biguity is found in the relationships between the
executive heads appointed by the higher-level executive and heads o f the
service directorates or departm ents in the local jurisdiction appointed by
respective line m inistries. Legally, the heads o f the directorates are the
budget holders for the respective sectoral funds in the governorates. Thus
each o f the 12 service directorates w ithin each o f th e 29 governorates
technically has full control over the developm ent and im plem entation o f its
budget and priorities w ithin the overall guidelines set by the relevant
ministry. But in practice, the governors may exercise considerable influence
in the budget process through “discussions” with the heads o f directorates
although the extent o f their involvem ent differs from govem orate to
govem orate. T he involvem ent o f th e governor m ay depend on his political
clout in the Prim e M inister’s O ffice and the Cabinet. M oreover, the budget
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negotiations between the M inistry o f Finance and the govem orates do not
always involve line m inistries (although according to the M inister o f
Finance, tripartite discussions will be held in the future). The inform ation
flows and decision lines are quite opaque, to the point that a recent report
from the W orld Bank (2005b) suggests that line m inistries m ay not know
w hat budget requests have been put forw ard by their directorates.
A third source o f am biguity arises from the unclear delineation o f
functions between the levels o f governm ent. Specific local functions
explicitly stated in the current Law o f Local A dm inistration o f 1979 appear
random and are scattered all over the text. T he law also assigns the sam e
functions to other levels o f governm ent. Saying that several governm ents
are responsible m ay sim ply im ply that nobody is responsible in particular.
Thus, w hile the previous point suggests unclear delineation o f
responsibilities between the national and subnational tiers, there is even less
clarity in the delineation o f responsibilities am ong the subnational tiers due
to the continued use o f the “ m atroshka” model from th e old Soviet
budgeting system. In this system every subnational budget is nestled into
the larger one o f the upper-level governm ent creating a relationship o f
vertical fiscal dependency and the ability to “pass on the buck” upwards.
A nother distinguishing feature o f this “budget within a budget” system is
the large degree o f fiscal discretion it perm its. Political and econom ic
pow ers vested in upper-level governm ents give am ple opportunities to
“rew ard one’s friends and punish o n e ’s enem ies” and clear-cut, objective
rules for determ ining fiscal allocations are extrem ely difficult to discern and
m ore fundam entally, they are unw anted. But unlike in the Soviet
“ m atroshka” system, in Egypt, the inform ation passed to the higher level is
even m ore aggregated.
A nother source o f opaqueness in budget flows, also inherited from the
old Soviet-style budgeting system is the lack o f an integrated approach
between the recurrent and capital budgets. Thus, drafting o f the
“ investm ents” chapter o f local budgets takes place com pletely outside the
sectoral budgetary process and is entirely channeled through th e M inistry o f
E conom ic D evelopm ent (form er M inistry o f Planning) hierarchy and added
to other econom ic item s in the budget only at the national level. This
disconnect continues during the budget execution; w hile the sectoral
directors are budget holders for sectoral recurrent expenditures, the
governor is the budget holder for block grants for spending on investm ent
projects, w hich are currently allocated by the M inistry o f Econom ic
D evelopm ent to govem orates on the basis o f a w eighted index o f population
and the H uman D evelopm ent Indicators. T he break o f the natural linkages
between capital and operational costs o f local governm ent activities not
unexpectedly leads to a w hole spate o f problem s. Thus, in the health sector,
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there appears to have been overbuilding o f hospitals and a failure to m ake
full use o f the existing stock o f hospital beds, with the result that in some
areas o f Egypt there is an excessive num ber o f hospital beds (W orld Bank,
2005a). In the w ater sector, investm ent in new infrastructure appears to be a
substitute for adequate preventive m aintenance o f the existing
infrastructure. The disconnect between the capital and recurrent parts o f
subnational spending is further aggravated by the lack o f horizontal
coordination am ong service directorates. This has led. for exam ple, to
situations w here a new ly built school is only partially used by students
because the financing o f the com plem entary supporting infrastructure, such
as roads, has been pushed back.
A nother elem ent o f opaqueness in the budget process is the practice o f
the extra-budgetary accounts (“Special D evelopm ent Funds” ), which
represent about 5 percent o f subnational resources— com parable to the
am ount o f local revenue from all own and shared taxes put together.
C onventionally th e use o f extra-budgetary funds at the subnational level
should be discouraged because they cause fragm entation o f budget
allocation decisions and reduce the efficient use o f resources (end users o f
these funds typically do not have to com pete with other potential users in
the budget) and because they reduce transparency an d accountability.
H ow ever, in the case o f Egypt, these special accounts provide the only
m eans for local authorities to exercise discretion in the allocation o f
resources according to local priorities. T he lack o f access to a broad-based
source o f revenue results in a plethora o f fees earm arked for ex tra
budgetary funds. In A ssuit governorate, an extra-budgetary fund created in
2001 to accum ulate revenues for cleaning and beautification activities had a
schedule o f fees including 52 item s (El Shawi, 2 0 0 7 ).10

WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD?
Since 2007 there have been serious discussions within and outside
governm ent over w hat shape and form fiscal decentralization reform should
take in Egypt. T his im petus has been reinforced by the support o f the
international com m unity in providing technical assistance for the
form ulation o f the technical aspects o f the refo rm ." A fter a series o f high
level conferences under the leadership o f th e M inistry o f Local
D evelopm ent and the preparation o f national decentralization paper for the
N D P m eeting in late 2007 (see Box 12.1), a lot o f work has gone into
drafting a national decentralization strategy and im plem entation plan. It
appears that the Egyptian G overnm ent understands well the im portance o f
developing a w ell structured policy vision before m oving into concrete
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im plem entation steps. In particular, the idea o f jum p in g on the w agon o f
am ending the Local A dm inistration Law in tim e for the past April 2008
elections was squarely abandoned.
D espite the NDP w orking paper guidelines, not surprisingly, for the tim e
being there does not seem to be clarity and agreem ent am ong governm ent
stakeholders regarding the m ain features o f the new decentralized system.
On the one hand, the leadership at the M inistry o f Local Developm ent
w orking together with the M inistry o f Finance is developing the elem ents
outlined in the N D P w orking paper in a quite different direction from the
one being developed by som e line m inistries, especially th e M inistry o f
Education.
In a thum bnail, the policy vision being developed by the M inistry o f
Local D evelopm ent and the M inistry o f Finance is based on four basic
points:
(i)

M aking the district the basic unit o f decentralization at the local
level, w hile the G overnorate w ould becom e a m ore clearly defined
deconcentrated territorial unit o f the central governm ent.
(ii) E m pow ering the district Popular Councils to m ake autonom ous
budget decisions on their own expenditure responsibilities or
functions assigned to them in an exclusive fashion by the law, and
for delegated responsibilities assigned to the districts through the
selected sectoral decentralization o f responsibilities w hich were,
until now, carried out exclusively by the central governm ent.
(iii) Funding o f the lio n ’s share o f th e expenditure needs o f the district
governm ents through block grants from the central governm ent,
although districts will be able to raise revenues through service fees
and other current revenue sources assigned to them.
(iv) Etablishing Financial C om m issions at the national and governorate
levels to oversee form ula-based distribution o f g ran ts am ong
govem orates and districts respectively.
T he vision for decentralization o f the M inistry o f Education is quite
different. Basically, the funds w ould flow directly from the M inistry to the
school council bypassing entirely th e district governm ent and budgets.
H ow ever, the discussion is lim ited to appropriations on m aterial supplies,
w hich currently account for less than 5 percent o f education directorates’
budget. The ongoing discussions include the possibility o f adopting sim ilar
approaches in other areas such as health.
It is too early to say w hich view, if any, will be carried forward. A lot
will depend on how the G overnm ent and the N D P view the political
opportunities and perils o f decentralization reform . As a sign o f anticipation
o f the grow ing im portance o f local governm ents and the decentralization
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B ox 12.1 N D P 's roadm ap fo r decentralization
• Empowerment o f LPC s to activate their monitoring role o f the executive councils, and
to establish local funds to mobilize local resources through authorized taxes and/or
charges;
• Devolution o f authorities related to public service delivery to the local level. In that,
the Governor would be the prime party responsible for planning and implementation
o f a package o f wide-coverage services (e.g. plant and network services - electricity,
sanitation, water supply, roads, etc.). Each govemorate will have a budget that
includes all allocations to deliver these services. Governorates would have the right to
move resources across line items in light o f legislated national standards and
measures, with the endorsement o f the LPCs;
• Markazes, and cities will have their own separate budgets allocated from the
respective govem orate. Markazes and cities are to use these budgets to plan and
implement delivery o f public services o f local nature (e.g. schools, family health care
units, cleansing systems, local networks o f public works, etc.). Cities and Markazes
will have the right to move resources across line items in light o f legislated national
standards and m easures, with the endorsement o f the respective LPCs;
• Governorates are to be the units for socio-economic development. They are to issue a
local developm ent program based on program s developed by cities and markazes o f
the govemorate. The national development program is to be based on these
governorates’ programs. The local program (govemorate, city, marakaz) should serve
as the basis for budgeting and expenditures for public service;
• Sectoral m inistries (e.g. education, health, etc.) are to develop and issue national
strategies including sectoral policies and national standards o f respective service
delivery. The respective quality assurance agency in each sector is to monitor
compliance o f these standards at the local level. National m inistries are to issue annual
reports including national averages o f indicators o f public service delivery, along with
information disaggregated at the govem orate level. These indicators will be used to
direct public resources to governorates with the highest levels o f needs to achieve
equity;
• The national governm ent will update the budgeting process to reflect new roles of
local authorities in the national expenditures. The governm ent is to issue financial
standards that are to be applied in localities in budgeting and financial reporting
presented to the central level. Formulaes to be used to distribute resources among
governorates are to be announced;
• Developing the financial and adm inistrative framework that enables establishment o f
local financial com m ittees at the govem orate level com prising the Governor,
Chairperson o f the LPC, a representative o f the Ministry o f Finance, a representative
o f the M inistry o f Local Development. The committee will distribute financial
allocations o f public services o f local nature (see above) am ong m arakezes and cities
within that govem orate to achieve equity am ong local units;
• The Ministry o f Local Development (M oLD ) is the governmental body responsible for
decentralization. It is responsible for coordination am ong central entities to activate
decentralization. The MoLD is also responsible for the performance o f senior
executives at local levels. It will publish reports about performance levels o f
governorates in devolved responsibilities. It will support local units in developing
their capacity to undertake new mandates.
Source: N D P (2007)
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reform s to come, the 2008 local elections saw unusually high com petition to
enter the electoral races. In the previous elections only 1.2 candidates
com peted for each seat w ith 60 percent o f seats taken by unopposed
candidates from the N ational D em ocratic Party. In 2008, the M uslim
B rotherhood put forw ard roughly 5,000 activists to com pete for som e
52,000 seats at the different levels o f local elections o f w hich only 500 were
able to register. M eanw hile, opposition parties put forw ard som e 4,000
candidates (1,700 from the liberal al-W afd, 600 from the leftist T agam m u’,
and 700 from the liberal al-G had), o f w hom only 1,200 successfully
registered (H erzallah and H am zawy, 2008). T here was also fierce
com petition am ong N D P m em bers to be nom inated as a party candidate
with 600 NDP m em bers quitting the party in protest o f not getting a
nom ination. However, there w as not as much com petition at the ballot as it
w as d uring the registration process. At the end the M uslim Brotherhood
decided to boycott the elections and voter turnout did not exceed 5 percent.
O ver 80 percent o f the 52,000 local council seats w ere w on by NDP
candidates running unopposed and overall 95 percent o f seats w ent to NDP.

CONCLUSIONS AND THE W AY FORWARD
T here are reasons to be m oderately optim istic about the prospects for fiscal
decentralization reform even if the obstacles rem ain formidable. The 2007
Constitutional am endm ents gave the national legislature som e control over
the President-appointed C abinet (confirm ation vote, vote o f confidence,
etc.). In particular, the national legislature got the right to am end the budget
put forw ard by the governm ent. This is in line with the proposed
em pow ering o f LPCs vis-a-vis LECs at the local level (N D P, 2007).
M oreover, the 2007 constitutional am endm ents added the follow ing clause
to A rticle 161: “The law shall guarantee the endorsem ent o f decentralization
and regulate the m eans by w hich the adm inistrative units can provide and
upgrade local facilities and services, im prove them and provide good
m anagem ent.”
On the other hand, the history o f Egypt has already seen local
governm ent reform initiatives, including legal and constitutional
am endm ents, w hich have failed to m aterialize. Thus, A rticle 162 o f the
1971 Constitution provided for “gradual transfer o f authority to the Local
Popular C ouncils.” H ow ever, 35 years down the road elected local councils
are still fairly pow erless vis-a-vis the executives and in fact have lost som e
o f the few pow ers that they used to have, such as the interpellation power.
T he lines o f horizontal accountability are still not established in the law
very clearly. Since th e abolishm ent o f the interpellation clause in 1988,
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popular councils have supervisory authority over lower-level popular
councils but no authority over their own executive branch.
The successful im plem entation o f the decentralization reform s this tim e
will depend on fleshing out som e o f the m ain elements:
1.

2.
3.

4.

Identification o f the expenditure responsibilities o f the district
governm ent, including both own or exclusive responsibilities and
delegated responsibilities from the central governm ents (through
sectoral decentralization).
Q uantification o f the expenditure needs that arise from the
expenditure assignm ents to the district governm ents.
Identification o f the financial instrum ents for the transfer o f funds to
be im plem ented by the M inistry o f Finance: D eterm ining the use o f
funds in the district governm ent budget (i.e., general funding at the
discretion o f the local governm ent versus conditional funding w here
the local governm ent can only use those funds w ith the conditions
attached by the central governm ent.)
The process o f the distribution o f funds through the G rants
C om m ission at the central level and the Local Finance Com m ission
at the governorate level.

In w hat follows we discuss in m ore detail how to carry out each o f these
tasks, pointing out som e options when pertinent.
Identification o f the expenditure responsibilities o f the district
governm ent. T hese responsibilities will need to be identified in the law. At
the present tim e, it is foreseen that the “ow n” or “exclusive” expenditure
responsibilities o f district governm ents will include street lighting, refuse
collection, and local/city roads. It m ay also be advisable to recognize as an
“ow n” expenditure responsibility the adm inistration costs the district
governm ent is expected to reasonably incur. For delegated expenditure
responsibilities, the prim e candidate currently is education services. G iven
all the political concerns, asym m etrical assignm ent m ay be the w ay to go.
T he Local A dm inistration law allow s a separate statute for “special cities”
and Luxor C ity has such a statute. It appears that new ly
reclaim ed/established urban settlem ents are governed by a special system
w ith a board o f trustees representing the local business com m unity,
households, labor and consum ers (Sawi, 2002).
Q uantification o f the expenditure needs that arise fr o m the expenditure
assignm ents to the district governm ents. This will be the most delicate and
im portant task in the decentralization reform s. The expenditure needs for
own responsibilities should be com puted separately from the expenditure
needs for delegated responsibilities. At some point in the future it may be
also desirable to separately estim ate the expenditure needs for the various

428

Decentralization in Developing Countries

own responsibilities, but that does not seem to be necessary at the present
tim e (given the anticipated expenditure assignm ents). It is important that the
criteria used to estim ate expenditure needs (either own or delegated
responsibilities) are reflective o f th e population needs them selves as
opposed to the existing capacity at the district level to provide the services.
For exam ple, a funding m echanism for education services based on the
num ber o f children o f school age is focused on need w hile a funding
m echanism based on the num ber o f classroom s available in the district
w ould be based on existing capacity. O bviously, this second approach
would send w rong incentives (build additional classroom s w ithout end) and
it w ould be much less equitable or fair.
T he sim plest approach to the determ ination o f expenditure needs for
own functions or responsibilities is on a “per capita basis” or on a “per
capita basis adjusted upw ards for the relative num ber o f fam ilies living in
poverty in the district.” In the case o f delegated responsibilities a sim ilar
approach should be follow ed. Since the only delegated responsibility in the
first phase o f decentralization will be basic education, the sim plest rule
w ould be to use a transfer form ula either based sim ply on the “num ber o f
children o f school age in the district" or the “num ber o f children o f school
age in the district adjusted for cost differentials across d istricts.” W hether or
not this second approach is desirable will depend on the existence or not o f
noticeable differences in costs in different areas o f the country in the
delivery o f a standard package o f education services.

Identification o f the financial instruments fo r the transfer o f funds to he
implemented by the Ministry o f Finance. T ransfers can take m any form s in
regards to th e use o f funds allow ed to the recipient subnational governm ent.
G iven the nature o f the assignm ent o f responsibilities for “own functions”
and “delegated functions” and also considering the im portance o f prom oting
autonom y and accountability at the local level, it would be desirable to
organize the transfers for own expenditure responsibilities as unconditional
grants and the transfers for education expenditure responsibilities as block
grants. (H ow ever, a valid case could be m ade in favor o f using conditional
specific grants, at least initially, in the case o f transfers for education.)

The process o f the distribution o ffu n d s through the Grants Commission
at the central level and the Local Finance Commission at the governorate
level. T he current strategic vision for decentralization considers the
introduction o f a N ational G rants C om m ission at the central level. It would
be the role o f the Com m ission to consider the pluses and m inuses o f
different form ulas and approaches, including the ones suggested here. T he
Com m ission would need to w ork with external technical support or rely on
the technical expertise of, for exam ple, the new ly created Technical O ffice
o f the M inistry for Local D evelopm ent. It is im portant to be aw are that both
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the National G rants Com m ission and the also the proposed Local Finance
Com m issions at the govem orate level m ust avoid w orking on a
discretionary basis, using hidden criteria, and so on. Instead these two
bodies m ust follow explicit and transparent formulas. But, for example,
there m ay be som e decisions local finance com m issions may m ake at the
govem orate level by selecting values for some o f the param eters in the
formulas.

NOTES
1.
2.

3.
4.

5.

6.
7.

8.

9.
10.

11.

This budgeting system was largely introduced to Egypt during its alignment with the Soviet
Union in the 1960s, which continued until Nasser’s death in 1970.
Thus, the World Bank Public Expenditure Review finds that "the poor allocation o f
resources and the lack o f a strategic approach to quality improvement are contributing to the
loss o f patient satisfaction with the public health services. As a result, most Egyptians,
including those living in the poorest regions, are more often seeking health services from the
private sector." (World Bank 2006, pp. 17-8)
A 2001 study by the General Authority on investment and Free Zonez (GAFI) found that a
new investment could involve as many as 22 ministries and 78 government agencies.
About 30 percent o f healthcare is covered directly from the budget, another 10 percent
through the social insurance scheme: while the private insurance accounts for less than one
percent o f total healthcare costs.
For example, on April 16, 2008, President Mubarak stated that Egypt’s “approach towards
decentralization is irreversible" and that "it has become an indivisible part of the
Constitution.” (Egypt State Information Service website).
The contents o f the NDP decentralization vision are discussed below in the chapter.
The main laws are: law 57 o f 1971, law 52 o f 1975 and the (current) law 43 o f 1979.
Furthermore, the last law has been amended several times by law 50 of 1981, law 186 o f
1981, law 26 o f 1982, law 106 o f 1987, law 145 o f 1988, law 9 o f 1989, and law 84 o f 1996.
While LPCs formally approve drafts o f the budget and final accounts before it is submitted
to the Ministry o f Finance, it is the latter who conducts negotiations with governors and
approves the final versions.
USD$1= 5.7 Egyptian Pounds (EGP).
Recently, these resources have been forced into the national Treasury system to generate
information and control o f the funds. This move, which in theory should not reduce the
autonomy o f local authorities in deciding the final use o f the funds, has been bitterly
opposed at the subnational level and it has been interpreted by many as a clear indication o f
the re-centralization designs o f the central authorities.
The international support effort has been lead by USAID but also with participation of the
UNDP, the World Bank and some other bilateral donors.
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